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DO POISON PILLS INCREASE FIRM RISK?
Thomas A. Turk*, Jeremy Goh**, Candace E. Ybarra***
Abstract
Management scholars have argued that an active takeover market discourages risk-taking by managers
and that takeover defenses serve to counter the risk-reducing pressures of an active takeover market.
This study employs the Black and Scholes Option Pricing Model to determine whether or not adoption
of poison pill securities increases investor perceptions of firm risk. The results provide evidence that
the Option-Implied Standard Deviations of common stock returns increase significantly on the poison
pill adoption date, on average. Furthermore, the implied standard deviations remained significantly
above pre-adoption levels for several days after the poison pill adoption, suggesting that the perceived
increase in firm risk is permanent. These results suggest the poison pills may serve a more constructive
role in the governance of publicly traded firms than is generally assumed.
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Many researchers have examined the impact of
“Poison Pill” securities on firm value. The results of
this research, which we summarize below, has been
mixed. But few researchers have examined the impact
of poison pills on risk taking. That is the research
question this paper addresses. Speicifically, we test
the hypothesis that poison pills increase the risk of
firms that adopt them.
Among the most controversial corporate
governance issues is the continued wide-spread usage
of poison pills. These special shareholder rights serve
to impede takeovers and can be adopted by firms
without
shareholder
approval.
Consequently,
institutional investors, shareholder activitists, and
corporate governance organizations view poison pill
adoption as a particularly aggregious disregard for
shareholder welfare. For example, Institution
Shareholder Services report that repealing poison pills
is one of the top 5 issues for 2007 among the
institutional investors they surveyed (Directorship,
2006).
The various high profile corporate scandals in
the United States including Enron, WorldCom, Tyco,
and most recently Broadcom have increased scrutiny
of corporate boards. Sarbanes-Oxley and the rising
influence of investor activitist organization have led
to more aggressive questioning of corporate
governance practices in general, and poison pills in
particular (Mills, 2004). The Wall Street Journal
(2004) reports that firms are dropping poison pills and

other takeover defenses, not only due to this
shareholder pressure, but to earn favorable ratings
from organizations that evaluate corporate
governance. This pressure has resulted in the
percentage of S&P500 firms with poison pills
dropping from over 60% in 2002 to 47% by 2005
(Jaffe, 2005). Repealing poison pills can be viewed as
a favorable development if they are harmful to
shareholder interests.
The Case Against Poison Pills
A long list of researchers contend that poison pill
adoption is, in fact, hostile to shareholder interests
because it reduces the threat of takeovers (Davis,
1991; Field & Karpoff, 2002; Jensen, 1984; Malatesta
& Walkling, 1988; Mallette & Fowler, 1992;
Ryngaert, 1988). Researchers long ago documented
gains to shareholders of takeover targets averaging
40% or more (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Jarrell,
Brickley & Netter, 1988). Consequently, any
managerial action that reduces the probability of a
takeover target being successfully acquired harms
shareholders. Preliminary research suggests that
poison pills represent one such managerial action.
Ryngaert (1988), for example, found that firms with
poison pills that received tender offers were almost
17% less likely to be successfully acquired than firms
without poison pills.
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By reducing the risk of takeovers, shareholders
are potentially harmed in a variety of ways. First, they
lose the bid premium from a possible takeover offer.
Second, they lose a valuable tool for removing
negligent executives that their board of directors will
not act to remove. Finally, executives free from the
threat of removal by a hostile acquirer can harm
shareholders by over-diversifying (Amihud & Lev,
1981; Hoskission & Turk 1992; Jensen 1984),
retaining free cash flows (Jensen, 1986), or underinvesting in research & development and other risky
investments. These conclusions obtain for both
established firms and IPOs (Field & Karpoff, 2002).
Malatesta and Walkling (1988) provided the first
detailed empirical analysis of the impact of poison
pills on shareholder wealth. They examined stock
market reactions to the poison pill adoptions through
Marhc 1986. They found that shareholders lost a
statistically significant .52% over the two days
surrounding the poison pill adoption. Malatesta and
Walking also provide evidence of lower accounting
measures of performance for firms adopting poison
pills than for comparable firms without poison pills.
In addition to the threat of takeover, marketbased incentives (executive stock ownership and
options), independent boards of directors, and large
outside investors can reduce the threat of persistent
mis-management or other agency problems.
Corporate governance scholars contend that, because
poison pills harm shareholders, their adoption signals
a breakdown in the internal governance structure of
the firm and their adoption will be more prevalent in
firms with problematic governance structures.
Problematic corporate governance structures would
include firms where top executives have small equity
investments, ownership is diffuse and boards of
directors lack independence.
Several studies have provided empirical
evidence that weak internal governance typifies firms
adopting poison pills. For example, CEOs of firms
adopting poison pills own less equity in their firms
than CEOs of firms without poison pills (Davis, 1991;
Heron & Lie, 2006; Malatesta & Walkling, 1988;
Mallette & Fowler, 1992). Davis found that firms
with poison pills have more diffuse share ownership
than firms without poison pills (Davis, 1991). Other
researchers have noted that poison pills are typically
adopted by firms with board structures that provide
more discretion to management to engage in
potentially self-serving behavior. Mallette and Fowler
(1992) observed that firms with poison pills have dual
leadership structures for their boards relatively
infrequently. Heron and Lie (2006) found evidence
that firms with staggered boards were more likely to
adopt poison pills than firms that do not.
Poison Pills Reconsidered
Although poison pills have come under scrutiny from
academics and practioners alike, poison pills continue
to be one of the most utilized defense mechanisms
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among Standard and Poor’s 500 companies and their
numbers are on the rise in small and mid-cap
companies (Murti, 2005). This may be the result of
the current heightened hostile merger and acquisition
environment and may indicate that poison pills serve a
constructive role for shareholders. For example,
poison pills may provide shareholders with more
bargaining power in a takeover attempt than they
otherwise would have.
In a tender offer with one bidder making an offer
to diffuse shareholders, the would-be acquirer enjoys
a monopsony. A poison pill that requires negotiation
with target firm management, creates a bi-lateral
monopoly, thereby increasing management bargaining
power. Target firms with concentrated ownership
(including large management stock holdings) would
not receive this benefit from poison pills because a the
tender offer bidding process would already be similar
to a bi-lateral monopoly. As noted above, researchers
have observed that firms adopting poison pills do not
tend to have concentrated ownership or top executives
with large equity holdings. Rather than providing
evidence of weak internal governance, this result is
consistent with the argument that the primary role of
poison pills is to increase bargaining power in the
context of a tender offer.
To the extent the poison pill delays resolution of
the takeover battle, other potential acquirers may enter
the takeover contest, creating a competitive market for
the target firm (Turk, 1992). Consistent with this,
Heron and Lie (2006) provide evidence that poison
pills are associated with higher takeover premiums
and higher shareholder value. Consequently, this has
caused many boards to reconsider their decision to
rescind their poison pills and has left shareholders
wondering whether the protective benefits of a poison
pill outweigh the risk of managerial misconduct. A
growing number of researchers are more directly
questioning the empirical evidence indicating that
poison pills generally harm shareholders. Ryngaert
found evidence of significant declines in firm value,
but for only selected subsets of his sample, whereas
Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994), Strong and Meyer
(1990), Turk, Zardkoohi, Hoskisson, Harrison, and
Johnson (1994),and Loh (1992) found no evidence of
significant declines in firm value associated with
poison pill adoption. Studies by Bhagat and Jeffries
(2005) and Coates (2000) suggest that econometric
problems with previous research led to the mistaken
conclusion that poison pills reduce firm market value.
Similarly, Turk, Goh, and.Ybarra (2007) found no
significant relationship between poison pill adoption
and the long and short-term earnings forecasts by
security analysts. Studies considering accounting
measures of performance also found no relationship
between poison pill adoption and decreased
performance (Brickley, Coles & Terry, 1992; Davis,
1991; Hebb & MacLean, 2006, Mallette & Fowler,
1992). A more recent study even provides evidence
that poison pill adoption is associated with improved
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operating performance (Danielson and Karpoff,
2006).
Finally, some researchers have argued that there
is no fundamental economic rationale leading to the
adoption of poison pills. Rather firms adopt these
takeover defenses because they are “fashionable”
(Soule & Strang 1998) or they have been adopted by
firms on whose board the top management sits
(Haunschild 1993). Consequently, these researchers
argue that poison pills hold little significance for
shareholder interests.
The research stream reviewed above provides
little evidence that poison pills generally harm
shareholders. Consequently, shareholder activist
groups, corporate governance ratings organizations,
and institutional investors pressuring boards to
rescind poison pills, may be over-reacting to the
preliminary theory and research from the 1980s
regarding poison pills. In the next section we describe
a rationale whereby poison pills perform a more
constructive role.
Poison Pills, Employment Risk, and Firm
Strategy
Whereas most scholars agree that threat of takeovers
places pressure on management, financial economists
have traditionally argued that the pressure an active
takeover market provides stimulates efficiency and
concern for shareholder interests. Others have argued
that pressure from active takeover markets, rather than
stimulating efficiency, stimulates risk aversion and
excessive concern about short-term accounting
performance (Drucker, 1984; Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson
1988; Lipton, 1985; Pugh, Page & Jahera, 1992;
Scherer, 1988; Stein, 1988). To the extent that poison
pills reduce the threat of hostile takeovers, they
should encourage risk taking, according to these
scholars.
Proponents of an active takeover market argue
that exactly the opposite result will obtain. To the
extent that poison pills reduce the threat of hostile
takeovers, they should encourage top executives to
engage in self-serving behavior. Given that
shareholders can own diversified portfolios of stock,
but top executives do not work for a diversified
portfolio of firms, agency theorists argue that top
executives will be more risk averse than shareholders
(Amihud & Lev, 1981; Jensen, 1986). Therefore, selfserving managers will forego long term and high risk
investments (Jensen, 1986; Jarrell, Brickley & Netter,
1988). Poison pills and other takeover defenses that
insulate top management from the threat of takeover
should have the opposite effect and should be
associated with reduced risk taking.
Research has long demonstrated that reducing
research and development and other risky or long
term investments reduces shareholder wealth
(McConnell & Muscarella, 1985; Woolridge & Snow,
1990). Market efficiency dictates that firms
committing resources to research and development

and other risky investments could not possibly be
persistently and systematically under-valued in the
marketplace. Thus, managers that are overly risk
averse in response to an active takeover market will
reduce the value the firms they manage in the short
run and increase the threat of a hostile takeover.
Therefore, the threat of takeover should lead selfserving managers to be less risk-averse.
The presence of noise in market valuations,
however, implies that the threat of takeover may
increase managerial aversion to risky investments
even if the market does not systematically undervalue
such investments. An acquiring firm gains from an
acquisition if the cost of the acquisition is less than
the post-acquisition value of the target firm (Barney,
1988). If the market value of a firm falls below the
potential post-acquisition value of the firm by more
than the cost of the acquisition, including any
takeover premium offered and other transactions
costs, the firm becomes an attractive takeover target.
Thus, the market value of a firm must fall
significantly below its potential value to face a serious
threat of takeover. If investors value firms without
error (that is, capital markets are perfect), then the
market value of the firm can only fall significantly
below its potential value if the management of the
firm is inefficiently administering its resources.
Capital markets are, of course, imperfect (Black,
1986). Financial economists are clear to note that
market efficiency does not imply that firms are priced
accurately, but rather that security prices are an
unbiased estimate of the future value of the firm.
That is, stock prices are neither too high nor too low
on average (Brown, Harlow & Tinic, 1988). Stock
prices represent "the market's collective estimatealthough a 'noisy' estimate, to be sure- of the present
value of the firm's future risky cash flows" (Brown,
Harlow & Tinic, 1988). As Black (1986) notes, "all
estimates of value are noisy" (pg. 533) and noise in
capital markets facilitates liquidity by creating the
opportunity to trade profitably (French & Roll, 1985).
An implication of noise trading in capital
markets is that "the short term volatility of price will
be greater than the short term volatility of value"
(Black, 1986; pg. 533). This suggests that noise may
cause a firm's stock price to trade significantly below
its potential value as perceived by potential acquirers,
for reasons other than ineffective management (Stein,
1988). Underestimates by the market or overestimates by potential acquirers pose the threat of
takeover to firms that are managed effectively (Roll,
1986). This conclusion does not depend on any
systematic bias in stock prices. Noise in stock prices
increases the probability that a firm will be both
significantly over-priced and significantly underpriced, even if it is valued accurately on average. It
also increases the probability that a would-be acquirer
will significantly over-value or under-value the target.
Only significant under-pricing by the market or overvaluing by the acquirer increases the threat of
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takeover and raises the employment risk of the top
executives.
This line of reasoning suggests that in efficient,
but noisy markets, any investments that increase noise
in security prices will increase the employment risk
for top management- even if those investments benefit
shareholders, on average. High risk investments are
those for which the costs and benefits are highly
uncertain at the time of the investment decision and
would lead to more subjective estimates of future cash
flows. This increases the probability of both over- and
under-valuing the firm, increasing the probability of
becoming a takeover target. Low risk investments are
those for which the costs and benefits are relatively
easy for the firm estimate at the time of the
investment decision and would lead to more precise
estimates of future cash flows. This decreases the
probability of both over- and under-valuing the firm,
decreasing the probability of becoming a takeover
target. Excessive diversification (Amihud & Lev,
1981; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990), excessive retention
of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986), and underinvestment in R&D (Stein, 1988) have all been
proposed as ways managers may harm shareholders
by reducing firm risk.
Where the risk to management employment is
high, agency theorists argue that top management will
make investment decisions to reduce that risk. Self
serving managers would be expected to forego high
risk investments in the face of an active takeover
market. In this study, we attempt to extend previous
research by testing the hypothesis that insulation from
the threat of takeover through poison pill adoption
increases firm risk.
Whereas several studies have examined the
impact of strategic events on the market value of a
firm, few have examined the impact of strategic
events on firm risk, Ferreira and Laux (2007)
examined the impact of takeover defenses on
idiosyncratic risk. In their study, they lump all
takeover defenses together, although previous
research has shown that many takeover defenses
clearly benefit shareholders (Turk, 1992; Walkling &
Long, 1984). In addition, these authors controlled for
factors that affect firm risk, whereas we propose that
poison pill adoption will be associated with
investments and other strategic decisions that affect
risk.
Methodological problems have traditionally
plagued efforts to associate particular events with
changes in risk. Most estimates of risk require data
measured over intervals during which a number of
confounding events may occur. Ferreira and Laux
(2007), for example, estimated the idiosyncratic risk
of a firm one year after adopting a poison pill. No
adjustment for confounding events was made in their
sample. Indeed it would be rather impractical to do so.
An examination of options prices, however,
provides an opportunity to estimate daily changes in
investor perceptions of risk. In this paper we test the
hypothesis that poison pills increase investor
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perceptions of firm risk by estimating changes in the
Option-Implied Standard Deviation of common stock
returns during the days surrounding the adoption of
poison pills. In doing so, we apply the methodology
that Levy and Yoder (1993) used to associate changes
in firm risk with takeover announcements. Although
previous research has examined the relationship
between antitakeover charter amendments and
investment decisions (Mallette, 1991), this study
provides a more direct test of the hypothesis that
takeover defenses encourage risk taking.
The model most widely used by academics and
investors for valuing options is a variation of the
Black and Scholes option pricing model (Black &
Scholes, 1973). In this paper, we use the BlackScholes model modified for dividends as suggested by
Merton (1973). The Black and Scholes model values
options as a function of their exercise price, the price
of the underlying stock, time to expiration, the rate of
return on risk free securities, and the volatility of the
underlying stock. Since all of these variables except
volatility are known, changes in the standard
deviation of the underlying security can be estimated
from changes in options prices. Changes in this
"implied standard deviation" (ISD) can be measured
during the days surrounding a strategic event to
provide an estimate of the change in firm risk
associated with that event. Beckers (1981) has found
ISDs to be better predictors of future stock return
volatility than those estimated from time series of past
stock returns and strongly suggests that ISDs do
reflect a firm's risk. This approach has been used in
the finance literature to estimate the change in risk
associated with a number of events, including stock
splits (French & Dubofsky, 1986; Sheikh, 1989),
mergers (Levy & Yoder, 1993), and earnings
announcements (Patell & Wolfson, 1981).
Methodology
To test the hypothesis described above we assembled
a sample consisting of all firms adopting poison pills
before January 1, 1987. The firms were identified
through the Corporate Control Alert, a legal news
letter that identifies all firms receiving poison pills
and the date of their adoption. We rely on this source
to maintain consistency with other studies of poison
pills (Brickley, Coles & Terry, 1992; Loh, 1992;
Malatesta & Walkling, 1988; Ryngaert, 1988; Strong
& Meyer, 1990; Turk, et al. 1994). Each of these
previous studies also focused on adoption of poison
pills prior to 1987. Thus our choice of sample
maintains comparability with previous research on
poison pills. Of these firms, we identified all firms
with options traded on either the CBOE, American
Exchange, Philadelphia Exchange, or Pacific
Exchange. To be included in the sample, a firm must
have an option trading near-the-money with an
expiration date more than 35 days after the event
period.
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The restrictions on option exercise price and
maturity mitigate problems associated with the BlackScholes model. MacBeth and Merville (1979) found
that the Black-Scholes model is less accurate for deep
in-the-money and deep out-of-the-money options.
MacBeth and Merville also show that the BlackScholes formula is sensitive to its underlying
assumptions for options near their expiration date.
Thus, we included the option for each firm with the
exercise price closest to the stock price on forty days
before the poison pill adoption (benchmark date). For
inclusion in the sample, the option expiration date
must be at least 35 days after the end of the event
period (4 days after the pill adoption). These selection
criteria resulted in a final sample of 57 firms.
To test the hypothesis that poison pill adoptions
are associated with an increase in Option-Implied
Standard Deviations, we compare the estimated ISDs
during the days surrounding the poison pill adoption
with a benchmark ISD estimated forty days prior to
the adoption. The benchmark ISD is estimated forty
days before the adoption to mitigate problems
associated with potential information leakage.
Specifically, we estimate:
ISDjt = ISDjt - ISDbj,
(1)
where
ISDjt = change in ISD from the base period for firm
j on day t (t=-4 to +4),
ISDjt = ISD for firm j on day t, and
ISDbj = ISD for firm j on day t -40, the benchmark
ISD.
The data required to estimate ISDs include: a)
the poison pill adoption date; b) the option price; c)
the option exercise price; d) the current stock price; e)
the option expiration date; and f) the risk free rate. As
with most previous studies on poison pills, the poison
pill adoption date was obtained from Corporate
Control Alert. Data on the option price, exercise price,
expiration date, and stock prices were all obtained
from the Wall Street Journal. Finally, the risk free rate
was estimated by calculating the yield on the U.S.
Treasury bill maturing closest to the option. Bid-Ask
rates for estimating the yield on T-bills were obtained
from the Wall Street Journal.
We calculated ISDs each day from four days
prior to the pill adoption through four days following
the pill adoption. The event period begins four days
before the pill adoption to control for the possibility
that information regarding the adoption leaked to
financial markets. We extend the analysis for four
days after the announcement to assess whether or not
any observed change in ISD is temporary. A T-test is
used to estimate the statistical significance of changes
in ISD relative to the benchmark. Specifically, the Tstatistic is calculated as:
____
2
Tt =
ISDt / (St / n)0.5,
(2)
where
____
n

ISDt =

ISDjt / n,
j=1

____
2
n
( ISDjt - ISDt )2 / (n-1), and
St =
j=1
n = number of firms.
Results
Table 1 displays the estimated mean difference
between the benchmark ISD and the event period
ISDs and the statistical significance of that difference.
The results presented in Table 1 offer support for the
hypothesis that poison pill adoptions are associated
with an increase Option-Implied Standard Deviations,
on average. Prior to the poison pill adoption date,
there is no statistically significant increase in mean
ISD relative to the mean benchmark ISD. On the
poison pill adoption date, mean ISD is a statistically
significant .0559 higher than the mean bench mark
ISD (t=2.561). Mean ISD continues to rise slightly
during the days following the poison pill adoption.
For days +1 through +4, mean increase in ISD relative
to the benchmark ISD remains statistically significant
with t-statistics ranging from 3.48 to 3.92 (p<.01).
This suggests that the rise in ISD is not a temporary
phenomenon but represents a shift in investor
perceptions of firm risk following the adoption of
poison pills. On day +4, mean ISD is approximately
30% higher than the mean benchmark ISD (t=3.784).
____________________
Insert Table 1 about here
____________________
Conclusion
Critics of poison pills argue that the threat of takeover
spurs efficiency and stimulates strategic change.
Other scholars have argued that the pressures of the
takeover market stimulate risk aversion and shortsightedness, rather than efficiency. This latter
argument implies that takeover defenses, such as
poison pills, may induce top executives to approve
risky investment that they may have foregone in the
absence of the takeover protection.
In this paper, we provide evidence that supports
the hypothesis that investors associate poison pill
adoptions with an increase in firm risk. Investor
perceptions of firm risk, as measured by OptionImplied Standard Deviations, rose a statistically
significant 30% following the adoption of poison
pills. This statistically significant increase in Implied
Standard Deviation continues to persist four days after
the poison pill adoption. This suggests that changes in
implied standard deviations following poison pill
adoption are not a temporary phenomenon but
represent a significant change in investor perceptions
of future firm risk.
Note that no systematic biases in capital markets
are necessary to generate this result. Rather, noise in
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capital market valuations discourages investment in
any area that significantly increases the degree of
noise. Thus, evidence of market efficiency in no way
implies that takeovers do not lead rational managers
to alter investment decisions. This result is consistent
with both agency theory and existing evidence on
capital market behavior.
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Appendices
Table 1. Mean Change in Option-Implied Standard Deviation
Between the Event Period and the Benchmark Period
This table provides the mean difference between Option-Implied Standard Deviations (ISDs) around the
announcement of poison pill adoption and the benchmark ISDs prevailing forty days prior to the adoption.
____________________________________________
Mean Change
Day
in ISD
T-Statistic
____________________________________________
-4
0.0215
1.337
-3
0.0195
1.358
-2
0.0248
1.582
-1
0.0293
1.887
Poison Pill
0.0559
2.561**
+1
0.0708
3.553**
+2
0.0767
3.481**
+3
0.0873
3.921**
+4
0.0851
3.784**
____________________________________________
* p<.05
** p<.01
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